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The Economics of Sportsmanship
Clair Smith
Cheaters never win and winners never cheat. Most children have heard this simple 
admonition at some point. It is truly unfortunate that it is not true. Sometimes athletes 
cheat and win, at least for a while. But it is rarely a good long-term strategy. And given 
the desire to win evident in athletes at all levels, maybe we should not be surprised at 
the occasional act of cheating, but rather at the rampant cooperation and sportsmanship 
that in fact transpires each day in professional sports stadium, high school and college 
facilities, and parks and sandlots across America. In this essay, we will use the tools of 
economics to examine and explain this epidemic of sportsmanship and good behavior.
Why Economics?
What does economics have to do with sportsmanship? Perhaps more than you think. 
Economics is much more than stock prices and GDP. Economics is the study of con­
strained choice in all aspects of life. As Alfred Marshall described in his 1890 textbook, 
“Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life” (Marshall 1890:1). 
Ludwig von Mises named his book on the subject simply but accurately Human Action 
(von Mises 1996 [1949]). Both of these definitions highlight the broad subject matter of 
economics. When a basketball player makes a split-second decision on whether to drive 
to the hoop, to pull up and shoot, or to pass to a teammate, she is weighing the expected 
costs and benefits of various actions—and making a decision we can analyze with the 
tools of economics. When the tennis player chooses whether to return the ball hard to 
the back corner of the court or to tap the ball over close to the net, he too is making an 
economic decision based on the expected benefits and costs of each course of action. 
Similarly, when neighborhood kids playing first base on the sandlot honestly call the ball 
fair or lie and say it was foul, they too are making an economic decision.
So how does economics have room for sportsmanship? Economists just preach self- 
interest, greed, and ruthless competition, right? In the 1987 movie Wall Street, Gordon 
Gekko gives a now famous speech about greed.
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, 
greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. 
Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge has marked the upward 
surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that
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other malfunctioning corporation called the USA. Thank you very much [Stone and Weiser 
1987],
Adam Smith is often considered the father of modern economics, and writes exten­
sively in his 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations about the importance of self-interest.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our din­
ner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, 
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages 
[Smith 1981 (1776):26-27].
Economists, following in Smith’s tradition, continue to emphasize the role of rational 
self-interest in describing human action and the functioning of the economy. Economists 
generally assume that people make purposeful choices in an effort to make themselves 
better off. But the economist’s nuanced understanding of self-interest is often incorrectly 
reduced in popular perception or understanding to an elevation of visceral greed. This 
common but misguided caricature of Smith and subsequent economists ignores most of 
what he discussed in both the Wealth of Nations (1776) and his previous book. The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759).
What Adam Smith Really Said
Many people think they know what Adam Smith says, but few have actually read 
his work. That is at least understandable, if not excusable, as The Wealth of Nations alone 
runs over 900 pages. And that does not include the 300 pages of important foundation 
laid in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In these works he does not condone the idea of 
greed; Readers will not find Gordon Gekko’s ode to greed in any of Smith’s work. Instead 
of a ruthless, win-at-any-cost competition. Smith describes a furthering of one’s personal 
interest—both financial and otherwise—within the bounds of moral and ethical conduct. 
And while not all economists embrace the totality of Smith’s views, the concept of self- 
interest in economics is quite broad and garners near-universal acceptance. Self-interest 
encompasses monetary gain as well as acts of charity and other good works that a person 
finds worthwhile. Economists of all stripes believe that individuals can maximize their 
well-being on many margins, not just financial. Some may seek money, power, or fame, 
while others seek health, spiritual fulfillment, or clean water for residents of third-world 
nations. And within the bounds of moral conduct, all of these are consistent with the 
economic idea of self-interest that Smith described and generations of economic thinkers 
since have espoused.
Thinking like an economist does not require that one adopt a win-at-all cost view 
of competition. The pursuit of self-interest allows for the inclusion of additional goals, 
like fair play and good sportsmanship. One way that Smith articulates a moral constraint 
on competitive behavior is through his “Impartial Spectator.” In describing how we can 
ascertain the moral appropriateness of our conduct, he envisions that we reflect upon 
our conduct as if from an impartial third-party perspective:
We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect 
it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some 
measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. If in this 
view it pleases us, we are tolerably satisfied [Smith 1982 (1759):112].
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This is essentially a Smithian version of the Golden Rule: Treat others as you wish to be 
treated. Or perhaps more precisely, treat others in a way that an impartial third-party 
spectator would find to be acceptable conduct.
The world of sports at all levels—from neighborhood sandlots to professional are­
nas—works better and provides greater benefits when operating on the foundation of 
ethical action that Smith espoused. It is good to work hard for oneself and one’s team, 
but one should do so within the bounds of legal and moral conduct. One might sum up 
what Smith describes with phrases more likely to come from scores of coaches at all 
levels across the land: “Play hard; Follow the rules.” But saying that economics allows for 
good sportsmanship and that good sportsmanship is a great idea still does not explain 
why we see so much of it. For that we need to continue our discussion of economics.
One More Economist: F.A. Hayek
Another important economist that should be considered in this discussion on eco­
nomics and sportsmanship is Friedrich A. Hayek. Hayek is less known than Smith, but 
he surely is no lightweight, winning the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. His thoughts 
are especially relevant here because of his extensive consideration of moral, social, or 
cultural constraints on human activity.
Hayek makes a careful distinction between what he calls law and legislation. For 
Hayek, legislation is manmade rules, like state and federal statutes and regulations. The 
“Clean Air Act,” speed limits, parking regulations, and local zoning ordinances, all con­
stitute examples of legislation. Sports are also riddled with official regulations, or in 
Hayek’s classification, legislation. Examples of sports regulations include the official 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules governing all aspects of college 
sports, as well as your local Little League’s rulebook. These man-made rules are pur­
posefully designed to constrain conduct, and there are designated consequences for 
breaking these rules. If a police officer catches you exceeding the speed limit or the referee 
catches you moving both feet without dribbling the ball, you have violated the recorded 
rules and will face the consequences as a result.
“Law,” in Hayek’s admittedly unorthodox distinction, is different. As Hayek expert 
Don Boudreaux (2006) explains it, “law is emergent patterns of behavior that [are] incor­
porated into people’s expectations.” While in common parlance law can be used as a syn­
onym for legislation, Hayek’s use is distinctly different. For him, law is the unwritten and 
unplanned rules by which we live. Boudreaux goes on to offer a telling example. When 
you place your coat on a chair or books on the table in cafeteria, it signals a kind of tem­
porary right to that seat (Boudreaux 2006). Others recognize this and refrain from sitting 
at that spot. This rule is not recorded anywhere; there are no formal sanctions. Yet as 
participants in a shared society we recognize this “law” and our interactions function a 
bit more smoothly because of it. Hayek himself notes, “Only the observance of common 
rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (1973:72). So when 
we hold the door for someone just a couple steps behind us, we are upholding cultural 
and societal “laws” that on net make our society function more efficiently. When a high 
school coach refrains from running up the score in a game of extremely mismatched tal­
ent, he or she is conforming to unwritten laws that guide action. In fact, a California bas­
ketball coach served a two game suspension after his high school team won a game 161-2
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{USA Today, 2015). While the coach did bench his best players in the second half and 
instructed them not to shoot until the shot clock was winding down, many found his 
use of a full-court press throughout the entire first half (yielding a halftime score of 
104-1) to be too much.
One final point on law and legislation should be made. It is possible for there to be 
an overlap between the specific written rules (legislation) and the unwritten norms and 
customs (law.) Hayek notes that law can be codified in legislation. When a common prac­
tice or social “law” is recorded in a statute or regulation, it becomes legislation. Most 
every civilization recognizes some kind of prohibition on murder. In many cases it is 
also codified in a particular criminal statute. The official rule book captures some of the 
“law” that governs sports interaction, but rarely does it cover all the scenarios and nuances 
that players face and understand.
“The Code” Is an Example ofHayeks Understanding 
of Law
What Hayek refers to as “law” is descriptive of what Ross Bernstein has called “The 
Code” in sports. Bernstein (2006; 2008; 2009) has written extensively about the code in 
hockey, baseball, and football. In each case he interviews hundreds of players and coaches 
to get an understanding of the constraints on their action and what unwritten rules they 
live by. And in each sport he finds that the unwritten rules—“the code of honor” as he 
calls it—is as important if not more important than the official written rules. As he uncov­
ers “the code” in professional sports, he finds that different players have variations on 
the theme, but that the essential elements are consistent.
In attempting to define the code in football, he quotes from a number of player 
interviews. Players talked about “putting the team first,” not playing dirty, and earning 
respect through conduct (Bernstein 2009:3, 5, 8,12). They described that even legal hits 
could be dirty, and this would lead to retaliation at another time, sometimes several 
games later. (This distinction between legal hits and dirty hits is a pertinent example of 
the overlap and nuance of the official rules [legislation] and the code [or law] that guides 
player behavior mentioned above.) Throughout Bernstein’s interviews, players frequently 
related that “putting the team first,” a key part of the code, means protecting your team­
mates, both on and off the field.
Retaliation is an especially important part of the code in the world of hockey. In his 
first in the series of code books, Bernstein investigates the purpose of fighting in hockey. 
And while there may be several reasons that fights break out in the course of hockey 
games, he finds that retaliation for unacceptable conduct on the ice is the common under­
lying theme. Players that he interviewed assert that the division of labor on an NHL team 
includes enforcers whose main job is to maintain an intimidating force that prevents 
opposing players from taking cheap shots on key players (Bernstein 2006).
The concept of unwritten rules may be most widely known and discussed in the 
area of baseball. Bernstein offers his book on the subject (2008), but there are others as 
well. Here are ten unwritten baseball rules drawn from Jason Turbow’s book. The Baseball 
Codes (2010):
1. Don’t swing at the first pitch after back-to-back home runs.
2. Don’t work the count when your team is up or down by a lot.
216 Part C: Sportsmanship and Social Institutions
3. When hit by a pitch, don’t rub the mark.
4. Don’t stand on the dirt cutout at home plate while a pitcher is warming 
up.
5. Don’t walk in front of a catcher or umpire when getting into batter’s box.
6. Don’t help the opposition make a play (bracing them from falling into the 
dugout, etc.).
7. Relievers take it easy when facing other relievers.
8. Follow the umpire’s code when addressing them on the field.
9. Pitchers stay in the dugout at least until the end of the inning in which they 
get pulled.
10. Pitchers never show up their fielders.
Other accounts of unwritten rules in baseball may offer a top-ten list that varies a 
bit from this one, but the similarities and underlying continuity will be remarkable. The 
list offers direction on how to act toward one’s own teammates, the officials, and the 
opposing team. And while not generally codified in an official rulebook, these principles 
of good conduct constrain how professional players interact on the field—providing a 
kind of order that facilitates productive activity in the game.
Here we have considered the existence of an unwritten code of conduct in football, 
hockey, and baseball. And it surely exists in most other sports as well. But as evidenced 
by the ten examples from baseball, there are fairly specific norms that generally constrain 
professional athletes in their unique sport. For example, spectators in tennis are generally 
quiet and reserved, and customarily cheer only good play. Yet in the Australian Open 
in 2013, top-ranked female tennis player Victoria Azarenka had to endure loud applause 
each time she made a mistake {The Economist 2013). This unseemly behavior was report­
edly retaliation for her perceived abuse of medical timeouts to regain her composure 
in a semi-final match two days earlier. This example is especially interesting because 
it shows the intentional breach of the norm of quiet civility from fans due to a perceived 
abuse of a kind of timeout loophole in the official rules based on urgent medical 
need.
Most of us are not professional athletes. We are not necessarily bound by the pro­
league codes of conduct that Bernstein explores. Yet many of us play sports at some level, 
or at least did when we were kids. So whether it is volleyball at the company picnic, 
church league softball, or any of the thousands of community recreation programs for 
children, is there a more general “law” that affects how we play and interact in these sit­
uations?
‘'The Law” in Sports More Generally
My kids, when playing t-ball at the local Little League park, are oblivious to the unwrit­
ten rules of baseball that Turbow describes. Yet they have some sense of the rules—both 
formal and informal. Their understanding of the official written rules is incomplete, as 
is their comprehension of “the code” or whatever we might want to call the general 
unwritten norms that govern our behavior. But they are developing a sense of what is 
acceptable and what is not.
They are unlikely to “boo” or otherwise reprimand teammates who cannot seem to
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connect with the ball no matter how carefully they swing. They are unlikely to do this 
because they know that kind of behavior is “not nice.” They would not want to be treated 
that way. Adam Smith’s impartial spectator would not approve of their “dissing” of a 
teammate. And treating teammates and opponents appropriately makes learning to play 
baseball tolerable or even fun. And as I hope to explain, it is what makes sports possible 
at all.
That sense of right and wrong—what is acceptable and what is not—continues 
to grow as one continues through sports. When running a lOK it is perfectly acceptable 
to pass other runners. But it is not appropriate to cut them off. These general norms 
of behavior—“laws” in Hayek’s view—affect and govern how we play sports and interact 
one with another. These norms are, at their essence, what we refer to as good sports­
manship. Sportsmanship is more than just following the written rules in the official 
rulebook for a particular sport at a particular competitive level. It encompasses how 
players treat members of their own team, the opposing team, the officials, and even the 
fans.
And sportsmanship enhances the enjoyment of the game at all levels. In fact, it 
makes the playing of sports possible. At the higher levels of competition there are officials 
to referee the activity. But if players did not generally follow the rules, there would be a 
continual series of breaks in the action while penalties are assessed based on the latest 
infraction. And what of the unregulated levels of competition? Sandlot baseball. Pickup 
hoops. Friendly tennis matches. These are only possible when there is a general predis­
position to follow the rules.
In a pickup basketball game, for example, a player may be expected to call one’s own 
fouls. Repeated “errors”—that is the failure to admit to fouling another player—may lead 
to the breakdown of the game, a physical altercation, or the exclusion of the offending 
player from future games. So while “cheating” by not calling one’s own foul may have a 
very short term advantage, it may ultimately lead to the dissolution of the game. If I want 
others to play by the rules and I want to play in the future, I learn that it is ultimately in 
my best interest to play by the rules.
The same thing happens in nearly every other sport. When most people play tennis 
they lack the luxury of a line judge. The players have to make calls regarding whether 
the ball was in or out. Some calls are not clear cut, and players may sometimes make 
mistakes, but if a player gains a reputation for cheating by dishonest line calls, that player 
may find it harder and harder to find someone to play. We could go on with specific 
examples from other sports, but the punchline would be the same. The very existence of 
enjoyable recreational sports depends on largely sportsmanlike conduct. Without wide­
spread adherence to the rules, play would break down altogether.
This can be expanded beyond the world of athletics. People can traverse a busy city 
sidewalk only because most people observe common norms and niceties that make social 
coexistence possible. Generally, people do not knock over or walk on top of other pedes­
trians. If one person tried this, they might initially get where they were going faster. But 
their clearly antisocial behavior would invite retribution from an enforcer of social norms 
in the crowd. “The Code” that Bernstein describes in the NHL (2006) exists on Manhattan 
sidewalks as well. And furthermore, if everyone adopted this me-first kind of excessive 
pedestrian competition all order on the sidewalk would break down completely. And 
what if this level of self-centered “greed” extended to the streets and highways? Imagine 
then the level of destruction we would observe.
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Exceptions to the Rule
As discussed before, sports are a specific application of how we interact with others 
in society every day. As we navigate rugby pitches, soccer fields, volleyball courts, and 
grocery stores, there are millions of peaceful interactions and exchanges between and 
among self-interested individuals each and every day. These competitive interactions are 
guided by social norms and conventions that allow us to fairly and productively engage. 
So as I mentioned early in this essay, I think the most interesting thing about cooperation 
and sportsmanship is its widespread existence. Our daily social interactions, athletic and 
otherwise, are built upon a foundation of generally good, appropriate, sportsmanlike 
conduct. Are there examples of bad sportsmanship? Definitely. But these are still the 
exception, not the rule. And I hope that the tools of economics have been useful in shed­
ding some light on this subject. But I would be naive and this essay incomplete to not 
acknowledge the instances of bad behavior and unsportsmanlike conduct.
There are in fact instances of dirty hits below the knees, uncalled fouls, and fabricated 
line calls, just as we observe rude behavior, arguments, fights, and other antisocial behav­
ior at the mall or on the street. Perhaps most concerning is the occasional display of bad 
sportsmanship at youth sports events—from the parents. Simply use your favorite search 
engine to look for videos available online using search terms along the lines of “parent 
bad behavior at youth sports.” How do we explain the atrocities produced from this 
search? Is economic theory wrong?
I have tried to show over the course of this essay that even in a competitive game 
and in a competitive world we have reason to cooperate. We can enjoy both recreational 
and professional sports only when most players play by the rules most of the time. But 
we know there are exceptions. Sometimes people cheat. And the economist, if she is con­
sistent and believes that people generally make choices that they expect to make them­
selves better off, must say that in that instance a person believed the benefit of cheating 
was greater than the cost. Maybe there was a lot riding on the outcome. Maybe they had 
an unusually short time horizon and did not think much about the consequences. Maybe 
their sense of ethical or moral foundations was not as well developed as most other play­
ers. Maybe they lost control of their tempers. Whatever the reason, they chose to violate 
the rules or norms in that instance. And if there are any consequences, they will bear 
those costs.
Most of us would agree that sports (and life) function better when people are gen­
erally playing by the rules and demonstrating good sportsmanship. I will leave it to others 
to suggest how best to achieve that goal, except to say these two things: We are fortunate 
that there is a long-term incentive to abide by the code of sportsmanship, and wise 
coaches in youth sports may be able to demonstrate and help develop an understanding 
of sportsmanship as young people grow and mature.
The Role of Game Theory
There is one last but important concept that we must consider in this economic 
look at sportsmanship, and that is game theory. A simple application of game theory 
provides a theoretical foundation for both why people might sometimes cheat, and an 
explanation for why people generally do not. Game theory is the consideration of the
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optimal strategy choice when the outcome depends on the combination of choices made 
by multiple players. (See Aumann 2008.) The common example of the “Prisoners Dilemma” 
is a fruitful place to start.
In the traditional Prisoners Dilemma, two criminal suspects are picked up by the 
police and taken to the station for questioning. The authorities have enough circumstan­
tial evidence to likely convict them each for lesser crimes, but to nail anyone with the 
more serious crime of which they are suspected, they need to elicit a confession. This 
leads to the setup familiar on most TV cop shows, where the suspects are interrogated 
separately and offered deals to reduce their sentence if they confess and provide the 
damning evidence against their criminal partner. Essentially the same deal is offered to 
each of the suspects, but the benefits are greatest where one suspect’s testimony is critical 
because the other has not confessed. Similarly, the penalty is greatest where one does not 
confess to the crimes but the former criminal partner does.
The essence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that, collectively, both parties would be 
better off if no one confessed; the aggregate Jail time is smallest with this scenario. This 
is considered the cooperative outcome. The problem is that each player individually 
could gain by confessing to the crimes. No matter what the criminal partner does, a 
player is strictly better off by confessing. This leads to the outcome of mutual confession, 
the scenario with the greatest aggregate Jail time. Yet this is considered the most likely 
outcome. Or more completely, this is the most likely outcome absent some kind of 
enforcement mechanism that allows or encourages the two suspects to cooperate. In the 
traditional prisoner’s dilemma, one method of enforcement might be “extra-legal” means. 
Suppose that both suspects were part of a criminal conglomerate or mob. There may be 
penalties exacted by the mob leaders on anyone who “snitches,” and those severe penalties 
may serve to keep anyone from confessing.
A variation on the Prisoner’s Dilemma is directly applicable to our discussion on 
sportsmanship. For any two players of a game, they could either exercise good sports­
manship or cheat (where “cheat” means in this case to violate either the written rules of 
the game or the unwritten rules of good conduct.) The best overall outcome occurs when 
both players exercise good sportsmanship. But each has a short-run incentive to cheat. 
That is, in a specific instance, there is some immediate gain to violating an official rule 
or norm of good conduct. Understanding why most players choose to exercise good 
sportsmanship in most instances in spite of the short-term gains from cheating requires 
a longer-term perspective, where reputation and repeated interactions are required.
Interactions in life represent a repeated game, not a one-shot deal. The same is true 
on the athletic field. Athletic success leads to continued play. One player’s success gen­
erally requires the cooperation of opposing players: I want my opponents to play clean 
and fair. And opponents are less likely to offer clean and fair play to someone known to 
cheat or play dirty, if they are willing to play them at all. There is an old expression that 
goes something along the lines of “Burn me once, shame on you; burn me twice, shame 
on me.” This colloquial expression sums up the power of reputation in sports and life. 
When someone is known to be a cheater, he or she is no longer afforded the same trust 
or respect, or is eliminated from play altogether.
In the terminology of game theory, reputation in a repeated game creates an enforce­
ment mechanism that encourages cooperation. Players find that it is in their best long­
term interest to forgo any short term gains from bad behavior in favor of the long-term 
gains from cooperation and sportsmanlike play. One of the important themes that emerge
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from Ross Bernsteins books on “the code” in professional sports is how players get a rep­
utation for good conduct or dirty play. He suggests that players who become known for 
dirty play do not generally last long in professional sports (Bernstein 2009). The code 
calls for retaliation against such action, and few teams will want a player who is destined 
for serious injury. This underscores the importance of reputation in professional sports.
Conclusion
There are good reasons to follow the rules. Sports work better in an environment 
of good sportsmanship and fair play. And economists, even as personified by Adam 
Smiths description of self-interest and competition, are also on board. Smith believed 
that a sound moral foundation is a necessary condition for the efficient and practical 
functioning of a market system. The public benefits created by the self-interested action 
of individuals must happen within the constraints of morality and sportsmanship. Each 
individual must develop some ability to self-regulate his or her actions for the long-term 
benefit of both themselves and everyone else. And whether one uses Smiths impartial 
spectator or the tools of game theory, economics predicts the widespread existence of 
good sportsmanship. In this context, I refer to good sportsmanship as adhering not just 
to the formal written rules of the game, but to the unwritten code of conduct that supports 
it as well.
Looking forward, economic theory and empirical observation provide a basis for 
optimism, despite the occasional acts of bad sportsmanship that make the news or cir­
culate the internet. Others writing in this volume may be better equipped to offer sug­
gestions on decreasing the instances of bad behavior that we observe. Yet this author 
finds that there are strong incentives for the continued widespread practice of sports­
manship. When parents, teachers and coaches model and teach good sportsmanship they 
can strengthen the moral foundation on which competitive activities like sports succeed, 
only increasing the odds of a continued epidemic of good behavior.
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